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The Neoclassical Economics of Consumer
Contracts
Richard A. Epsteint
There is little doubt that the major new theoretical ap-
proach to law and economics in the past two decades does not
come from either of these two fields. Instead it comes from the
adjacent discipline of cognitive psychology, which has now
morphed into behavioral economics. Starting with the path-
breaking work of Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman in the
1970s, the field has asked one question in a thousand guises: do
ordinary people obey the principles of rational choice in making
their decisions?' The usual answer given in the field is that in
at least some domains they do not.2 The new law and economics
literature uses these behavioral findings, especially in the
study of cognitive bias, to open a new chapter in the long-
standing debate over the extent to which market failures pave
t The James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The
University of Chicago, and the Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The
Hoover Institution. My thanks to the participants at the Colloquium on Mar-
ket Institutions and Economic Processes at the New York University Depart-
ment of Economics. I should also like to thank Chad Clamage, Stanford Law
School, Class of 2008, and Uzair Kayani, University of Chicago Law School
Class of 2009, for their expert research assistance. Copyright © 2008 by Ri-
chard A. Epstein.
1. Cf. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND
BIASES 3, 3 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) ("How do people assess the
probability of an uncertain event or the value of an uncertain quantity?").
2. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263 (1979); Tversky & Kahne-
man, supra note 1, at 11. For applications, see GERD GIGERENZER ET AL.,
SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART (1999) (detailing the use of heuris-
tics to make "real world" decisions) and Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuris-
tics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 751-52 (2003) (reviewing HEURISTICS AND BIASES:
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds.,
2002)) (describing the use of heuristics in connection with litigation decisions).
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the way for government regulation 3-with the added twist that
just about any market is now a plausible target for a new round
of regulation.
The usual point of controversy is the neoclassical conclu-
sion that competitive markets-markets with multiple, self-
interested players on both sides, armed with relatively full in-
formation-will generate a mix of goods and services that is
superior to those that can be generated with various forms of
government regulation.4  Conscious deviations from well-
functioning competitive markets introduce either unwanted
barriers or subsidies, both of which reduce overall output in the
regulated sector, with spillover losses elsewhere in the general
economy. 5 The state creation of monopoly by entry restrictions,
for example, will not only have a negative effect on the quanti-
ties and prices of the goods and services available to buyers and
their customers, 6 but will also provide an unwanted subsidy to
the sellers of competitive technologies and services who operate
in an unregulated segment of the market.7
There are, however, two sets of well-recognized circum-
stances in which the neoclassical theory accepts that some gov-
ernment intervention may make sense: private monopoly and
3. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on
the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA.
L. REV. 630, 682 (1979) ("The existence of imperfect information is commonly
thought to justify market intervention by courts and legislatures because of
the predominant belief that an imperfectly informed buyer cannot make utili-
ty-maximizing purchase choices.").
4. Cf. F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV.
519, 530 (1945) (describing issues caused by imperfect and dispersed informa-
tion).
5. See HENRY HAZLITT, ECONOMICS IN ONE LESSON 114-15 (3d ed. 1946)
("It is only the much vilified price system that solves the enormously compli-
cated problem of deciding precisely how much of tens of thousands of different
commodities and services should be produced in relation to each other. These
otherwise bewildering equations are solved quasi-automatically by the system
of prices, profits and costs.... [Wihereas bureaucrats would try to solve it by
having made for the consumers, not what the consumers themselves wanted,
but what the bureaucrats decided was good for them.").
6. See id. at 127 (stating that holding a commodity's price below market
increases the demand for and reduces the supply of the commodity, leading to
lower production levels).
7. Cf. id. at 131 ("If we ration one commodity, and the public cannot get
enough of it, though it still has excess purchasing power, it will turn to some
substitute. The rationing of each commodity as it grows scarce, in other words,
must put more and more pressure on the unrationed commodities that re-
main.").
[92:803
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imperfect information.8 The first arises in industries that, for
one reason or another, do not assume competitive form.9 In
some instances, the best solution is to mandate that the parties
cease all cooperative efforts and operate in direct competition
with each other.1 0 At its best antitrust law seeks to neutralize
the risk by prohibiting or terminating trusts and monopolies
that restrict output, raise prices, or divide territories.' In some
cases, however, competitive solutions are not attainable. Here
direct forms of rate regulation may be adopted to cope with the
problems of natural monopoly-when a single firm is the
cheapest provider of any given level of output, as sometimes oc-
curs with energy transmission, transportation, and communi-
cations. 12 The monopoly issue has been raised with respect to
certain practices of credit card companies,' 3 but I shall not con-
sider it here.
The second topic-imperfect information-is more vast be-
cause it addresses the effects of misinformation on the opera-
tion of the full range of product and service markets. These dif-
ficulties can arise irrespective of the underlying market
structure: both competitive and monopolistic markets fall with-
in its scope.' 4 The basic instinct here is both simple and power-
8. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 369 (7th
ed. 2007) (discussing the use of regulations in instances of natural monopoly);
Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 3, at 682.
9. See POSNER, supra note 8, at 369 ('The traditional solution to the
problem of natural monopoly in this country was public utility or common car-
rier regulation .... This type of regulation has three primary elements: (1)
profit control . . . (2) entry control . . . [,and] (3) control over price structure
.... .).
10. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (prohibiting cooperation between parties in
the furtherance of a monopoly).
11. See id. §§ 1-2 (prohibiting the formation of trusts and monopolies "in
restraint of trade or commerce"). Note that actions under § 1 are typically di-
rected to horizontal activities with clear negative impacts on markets. Section
2 cases are often directed toward exclusive practices by "dominant" firms in
the market, whose social dislocation is much more difficult to determine or
counteract. For a discussion of the difficulty with consent decrees, see general-
ly RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, ANTITRUST CONSENT DECREES IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE: WHY LESS IS MORE (2007).
12. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55,
56 (1968); Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN.
L. REV. 548, 570 (1969).
13. See, e.g., In re Visa ChecklMastermoney Antitrust Litigation, 280 F.3d
124 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing an antitrust action brought by retailers against
credit card associations).
14. Even in the competitive securities market, imperfect information
creates difficulties, but it is highly debated whether the elaborate scheme of
HeinOnline  -- 92 Minn. L. Rev. 805 2007-2008
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ful: inaccurate calculations of expected benefits and/or costs of
particular courses of action are likely to lead to the wrong
choices.
Within the standard neoclassical field, no one doubts the
existence of these structural or informational impediments to
the operation of strong markets. 15 But an immense debate aris-
es over whether-and if so, what types of-government regula-
tion make sense in responding to these ills.16 The neoclassical
tradition establishes a presumption against regulation in both
these areas for three simple and compelling reasons. First, all
forms of public intervention cost money, so the proper question
is not whether the current market operates imperfectly, but
whether the costs of correcting the imperfections exceed the
costs of allowing particular imperfections to remain.17 Second,
most neoclassical economists fear that regulation will be mis-
guided because of some misidentification of the particular im-
public disclosure reduces the risk of fraud or sharp practice. The early study
on this point, George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37
J. Bus. 117, 124 (1964), finds that disclosure regimes have had little effect of
the price and quality of new issues. And similarly skeptical results have been
reached in Robert Daines & Charles M. Jones, Mandatory Disclosure, Asym-
metric Information and Liquidity: The Impact of the 1934 Act 3-4 (Mar. 2005)
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://papers.ssrn.comsol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=686888), which finds little or no improvement in reducing asym-
metrical information or promoting market liquidity, but some advantage in
allowing issuers to make credible disclosures. There is an evident tension be-
tween the first and third findings, which suggests that the benefits of a disclo-
sure regime are modest at best. More ambitious schemes are likely to prove
even less successful. See POSNER, supra note 8, at 482 ("A careful study finds
that [disclosure] securities law[s] .. .bring[] about a net improvement in the
operation of stock markets, though more ambitious forms of public regulation
of securities markets do not." (citation omitted)).
15. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 13 (1962) ("The
possibility of co-ordination through voluntary co-operation rests on the ele-
mentary-yet frequently denied-proposition that both parties to an economic
transaction benefit from it, provided the transaction is bi-laterally voluntary
and informed.").
16. Compare Posner, supra note 12, at 635-36 (arguing for "sweeping"
changes in the regulatory scheme for natural monopolies), with Schwartz &
Wilde, supra note 3, at 671-73 (arguing for a restrained regulatory response to
the problem of imperfect information).
17. See, e.g., HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 675 (6th
ed. 2003) ("[Imf the government can compel people of all risk classes to pur-
chase insurance, it is possible for everyone to be made better off. This is, on
the face of it, a good case for intervention. On the other hand, there are costs
to government intervention as well; economic decisions made by governmental
decree may not be as cost-effective as those made by private firms.").
[92:803806
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perfection.18 For example, it is easy to think that the minimum
wage cures the problem of inequality of bargaining power when
in fact it distorts labor markets, as by hurting nonunion compe-
tition to union firms.19 Third, powerful political forces, with ex-
cellent private knowledge, often turn regulation to their own
parochial ends by creating barriers to entry that block or ham-
per the emergence of strong competitive markets. 20
This cautious approach applies both to information mar-
kets generally, and to the full range of inventive arguments
that Professor Oren Bar-Gill has advanced for the increased
level of regulation in credit card markets in particular. 21 Infor-
mation breakdown comes in all forms, from deliberate fraud to
inadvertent mistake. Without question the first order of public
business is the control of fraud, which is limited in scope and
serious in consequences. 22 Simple mistakes are far more perva-
sive, but at the same time far more difficult to prevent. It is
possible to take some simple steps that will reduce the rate of
error, such as requiring standardized disclosures, without im-
posing heavy burdens on regulated parties. 23 Here, it is never
quite clear whether the sensible forms of regulation duplicate
the protections that would exist anyway in voluntary markets.
But even if we put the prospect of sensible self-regulation to
one side, there is little reason to quarrel with the disclosure of
Annual Percentage Rates (APRs) under Truth in Lending Act
(TILA), even if other provisions of the same statute are far too
intrusive. 24 That one targeted intervention eliminates countless
errors by ordinary consumers and aids comparison shopping by
18. See, e.g., Hayek, supra note 4, at 519-21 (discussing the problems of
central regulation in a market with imperfect information).
19. See Richard A. Epstein, On Wal-Mart: Doing Good by Doing Nothing,
39 CONN. L. REV. 1287, 1300-04 (2007) (stating that minimum wage laws are
set to price out nonunion workers without pricing out union workers).
20. See POSNER, supra note 8, at 382 ("Regulation is more plausibly
viewed as a product ... that is demanded by and supplied to the members of
political pressure groups rather than to the general consuming public.... Coa-
litions between special-interest consumer groups . . . and members of an in-
dustry may be especially effective in manipulating the regulatory process.").
21. See Oren Bar-Gill, Exchange, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer
Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 749 (2008) [hereinafter Bar-Gill, Exchange, Beha-
vioral Economics].
22. Cf. Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 3, at 671-73 (arguing for more re-
laxed regulation of imperfect information when fraud is not involved).
23. See POSNER, supra note 8, at 482 (discussing the use of securities reg-
ulations as a means of preventing asymmetrical information).
24. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1606 (2000) (describing the
definition and disclosure requirements for annual percentage rates).
2008]
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standardizing interest rate calculations. 25 The question is how
much further the law ought to go. The correct answer, I think,
is not very much further at all. Disclosure regimes are freely
praised in the abstract, and at some level they work. 26 But the
law is littered with expensive disclosure regimes, such as those
administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission,27
that have ever more dubious utility as they expand in scope
and ambition. The best approach is to harvest the low-hanging
fruit and then put the ladder away.
On this basic question, it is not surprising to find a good
deal of separation between the behavioral approach cham-
pioned by Bar-Gill 28 and the neoclassical approach to which I
gravitate. The cognitive bias literature generally favors ex-
panding the range of government regulation to address a wide
variety of business practices that exploit the bias of consumers,
or at least some consumers.29 I have resisted this regulatory
impulse in a number of recent papers that deal with this is-
sue. 30 One of these articles argues that in general, light-handed
regulation such as APR disclosure is all that is required for the
25. See generally William C. Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure Regu-
lation in Consumer Transactions, 1973 WIS. L. REV. 400, 404 (identifying the
purposes of disclosure regulations, "including the goal of inducing consumers
to become more careful shoppers").
26. For an example of useful disclosure rules in the securities market, see
supra note 14 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-
Oxley: The Irony of "Going Private," 55 EMORY L.J. 141, 147-49 (providing
empirical evidence of the costs of compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley disclosure
rules).
28. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, Bundling and Consumer Misperception, 73 U.
CHI. L. REV. 33 (2006) [hereinafter Bar-Gill, Bundling and Consumer Misper-
ception]; Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373 (2004)
[hereinafter Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic].
29. See, e.g., John D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism
Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420,
1554-55 (1999) (arguing that enterprise liability is needed to correct the ef-
fects of market manipulation and consumer underestimation of product risks).
30. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Behavioral Economics: Human Errors
and Market Corrections, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 111 (2006) [hereinafter Epstein,
Behavioral Economics] (discussing consumer mistakes and maturation and
noting the corrective sufficiency of existing legal and market remedies); Ri-
chard A. Epstein, The Regulation of Interchange Fees: Australian Fine-Tuning
Gone Awry, 2005 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 551 [hereinafter Epstein, Interchange]
(analyzing the effects of interchange fee restrictions imposed on the credit card
industry by the Reserve Bank of Australia); Richard A. Epstein, Second-Order
Rationality, in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE 355 (Edward J. McCaffery &
Joel Slemrod eds., 2006) (examining the limitations of rational choice theory
and behavioral economics).
808 [92:803
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burgeoning consumer credit card market. 31 More ambitious ef-
forts to combat cognitive mistakes by direct regulation or dis-
closure provisions do not, in my view, overcome the strong pre-
sumption of error under which they should be evaluated.
In his present Article, Bar-Gill takes explicit issue with my
point of view. 32 In a well-turned phrase drawn from antitrust
law, he announces himself a believer in the "rule of reason"
with respect to various regulatory approaches to these consum-
er contracts.33 He places that position in opposition to my own,
which he accurately describes as favoring, with only limited ex-
ceptions, a per se rule of no regulation beyond such narrow
matters as the APR. 34 He has marshaled an impressive array of
theoretical and empirical evidence to support his position, but
in the end his extensive critiques do little to undermine my ear-
lier position. As the focal point for his recent analysis is my
University of Chicago paper, I was happy to accept his kind in-
vitation to write a critique of his position.
My position, as articulated in prior articles, rests on sever-
al assumptions. First, the voluntary actions by individual con-
sumers and their advisors, as well as by competitive sellers,
tend to close an information gap in credit card and other mar-
kets with standardized products.35 Incidentally, in preparing
this Article, I took a look at many retail websites on a variety of
industries and came away with the clear impression that pric-
ing clarity is more widespread now than it has ever been. 36
31. Epstein, Behavioral Economics, supra note 30, at 125, 128 (arguing
that credit regulations beyond the disclosures mandated by the TILA are un-
necessary).
32. Bar-Gill, Exchange, Behavioral Economics, supra note 21, at 753-54.
33. Id. at 754.
34. Id. at 753-54.
35. See generally Epstein, Behavioral Economics, supra note 30, at 123-
32.
36. A Google search with the term "compare price" will yield numerous
sites that offer prices for similar goods from different sellers. See, e.g., Buyer's
Edge, http://www.buyersedge.com (last visited Nov. 30, 2007) (offering a venue
for comparing products and prices from various sellers); eBay, Buying Re-
sources, http://pages.ebay.com/buy/resources.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2007)
(providing buying resources for comparing prices in primary and secondary
markets across a range of products and services); Insurance.com, Compare
Auto Insurance Quotes from Top Auto Insurance Companies, http://www
.insurance.com (last visited Nov. 30, 2007) (facilitating the comparison of in-
surance premiums and coverage plans offered by various companies); Len-
dingTree Home Loans, http://www.lendingtree.com (last visited Nov. 30, 2007)
(allowing consumers to compare lending offers from numerous banks and pro-
viding advice for borrowers); Nextag, http://www.nextag.com (last visited Nov.
2008]
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Second, any one-size-fits-all regulation will not perform well in
markets characterized by extensive consumer heterogeneity.
And third, the regulation will often backfire by creating market
distortions or barriers to entry.
It will, however, serve little purpose to repeat those argu-
ments here. Rather the focus shall be on Bar-Gill's critique of
my own position. Accordingly, Part I of this Article deals with
the interaction between mistakes and standardization in con-
sumer markets. I conclude that Bar-Gill overstates the level of
consumer error by underestimating the corrective powers al-
ready at work, chiefly because he relies on an unduly cramped
definition of a "standardized" good or service. Part II then criti-
ques some of the key illustrations that Bar-Gill offers to show
how credit card companies and other firms exploit these syste-
matic biases. I conclude that his oversimplified description of
these markets leads him, and the behavioral economists on
whom he relies, to ignore more traditional explanations that
better account for the apparently irrational behavior that they
observe. Part III then examines his more global case for regula-
tion, and concludes that it offers no blueprint for advancing
beyond the extensive forms of regulation (some of which we
could well do without) that are now in force. Credit markets are
not perfect, but the introduction of new technologies, especially
on the Internet, has vastly improved their operation and re-
mains the most powerful way to combat all sorts of consumer
misperceptions.
I. MISTAKES IN STANDARDIZED MARKETS
Bar-Gill and I both start from the same initial premise that
cognitive mistakes are endemic to human behavior.3 7 Individu-
al capacities to calculate the odds by formal methods are quite
limited, for it is easy even for the educated to fall into the ma-
thematical traps that have long delighted the examiners who
set problems for the College Boards. People's ability to learn by
experience supplies a useful counterweight, but experience only
prepares us for some the decisions we face; there are many oth-
er contingencies for which a diploma from the school of hard
knocks does not help. Any argument in favor of markets, there-
fore, cannot realistically rest on any assumption of strong ra-
tionality, whereby everyone gets their sums (and double inte-
30, 2007) (facilitating comparison shopping for products, mortgages, and real
estate, among other things).
37. Bar-Gill, Exchange, Behavioral Economics, supra note 21, at 749.
810 [92:803
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grals) right all the time. Indeed, if they could, state regulation
would be far more reliable than it typically is, given that even
regulators cannot transcend the various biases that plague or-
dinary individuals.
Against this background, the neoclassical case for markets
rests on the more qualified assumption that learning actually
matters. To the extent that the issues that truly matter to
them, people develop, if they do not already have them, good
feedback mechanisms that lower the risk of loss, especially in
standardized transactions where consumers are repeat players.
People do so because they pay the price for their own error.
Some evidence for this result comes from a recent study of con-
sumer behavior in six different kinds of credit markets-home
equity loans, home equity lines of credit, credit cards, auto
loans, small business lines of credit, and late fees for credit
cards-prepared by Sumit Agarwal, John Driscoll, Xavier Ga-
baix, and David Laibson, 38 which investigates the relationship
between age and cognitive performance. 39 What I regard as
most valuable about this study is that it does not rely on look-
ing at studies of college students' behavior, but tries to organize
extensive data about the behavior of real people of all ages in
credit markets.40
The relationship they posit is identical to that which ap-
plies to everything from mathematics to athletics. The re-
searchers note that people in their early twenties have power-
ful analytic and memory skills, but are weak in experience. 41
As they grow older, the basic mental skills slowly begin to de-
preciate, but those losses are offset, usually more rapidly, by
gains in experience, so that the life-cycle pattern, which nets
out these two effects, shows first improvements in performance
and thereafter a slow decline that intensifies toward the end of
life. 42 By the researchers' account, these effects are more or less
constant across the different kinds of credit markets.4 3 Peak
38. Sumit Agarwal et al., The Age of Reason: Financial Decisions over the
Lifecycle (Mass. Inst. of Tech. Dep't of Econ. Working Paper Series, Working
Paper No. 07-11, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=973790.
39. Id. at 2.
40. Id. ("This paper documents cross-sectional variation in the prices that
people pay for financial services.").
41. Id. ("We hypothesize that financial sophistication depends on a combi-
nation of analytic ability and experiential knowledge.").
42. Id. at 2-3.
43. Id. at 6-29 (noting a consistent pattern in the relationship between
age and financial sophistication in ten separate contexts).
2008] 811
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performance-after controlling for income, education, credit-
worthiness, and other observable variables-comes around age
fifty-three. 44 In addition, the researchers' work reports limited
variation across consumers of any given age; for example, in
the home equity market, people who avoid familiar traps in
borrowing (called rate-changing mistakes) are charged roughly
the same interest rate by lenders in a given situation regard-
less of their ages.45 Rate-changing mistakes, meanwhile, de-
cline sharply-from about 70% at age twenty to under 10% at
age fifty-with the sharpest declines coming before age thirty.46
The results of these studies should be encouraging because
they show that learning really does matter in these contexts,
and lead, in my view, to the conclusion that education on how
loans work is often the best protection against various kinds of
dangerous credit practices. In addition, the study does not cov-
er the important (but difficult to measure question) of which
persons in the various cohorts are most likely to make mis-
takes.47 Thus, it would be useful to see how the rate of error va-
ries with educational levels across age, where the prediction is
that the curve would be flatter and lower for those with more
education at any given age.48 It would also be useful to know
how the frequency of various rate-changing mistakes varies
with the ability to get advice from parents (when young) or
children (when older) on how to conduct these transactions.
Learning in this form is likely to have powerful effects,
both in life generally and in credit card transactions. With ex-
perience, people can become familiar with, or learn to specialize
in certain types of transactions. Either way, people can in-
crease the fraction of their decisions over which they have or
can acquire effective expertise. It does not, therefore, matter if
they are unable to generalize from their experiences to the
larger scientific or decisional principles that lie behind their lo-
44. Id. at 30.
45. Id. at 15.
46. Id. at 14 (charting rate-changing mistakes by age in the context of
home equity loans and home equity lines of credit).
47. Id. at 2 (speculating that cohort effects may also contribute to some of
the observed findings).
48. For example, higher-educated borrowers are likely to act on better ad-
vice, since the information asymmetries between them and their advisors are
less acute than they would be for lower-educated borrowers. See id. at 43
("Advice markets may not function efficiently because of information asymme-
tries between the recipients and the providers of advice." (citing Uwe Dulleck
& Rudolph Kerschbamer, On Doctors, Mechanics, and Computer Specialists:
The Economics of Credence Goods, 44 J. ECON. LIT. 5, 6 (2006))).
812 [92:803
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calized choice. The Inuit build heat-efficient igloos because sur-
vival is at stake, not because they are versed in the advanced
principles of thermodynamics. 49 For those events on which
people have little direct knowledge, they need not rely solely on
the input from potential transactors on the other side of the
market. Often they seek advice either informally from friends
or for hire from professionals who know more than they do.
People who cannot figure out complex financial choices are not
unaware of their own limitations. Knowing what they do not
know, they hire in droves financial advisors or invest in mutual
funds.50 And they may turn to different professionals if they
need help in coping with depression or picking a mate. These
common-sense checks against mistakes do not work in all cas-
es; nor does their use reduce the error rate to zero. But their
consistent tug protects most people most of the time. No one
could claim that no consumer will fall for the same marketing
ploy twice. Yet by the same token, there is little hard evidence
that consumers are impervious to knowledge, and studies like
Agarwal's suggest that even in credit markets, people usually
learn both from their own errors, and from the errors of oth-
ers-bad news travels fast.5 1 We should not expect an epidemic
of horror stories just because the law of large numbers guaran-
tees that some inexcusable incidents will occur in markets that
feature billions of transactions involving millions of people each
day. Given that people are anxious to avoid financial losses, the
widespread availability of protective devices5 2 makes it unwise
to assume that an additional layer of public regulation will per-
form any useful protective function. To the contrary, the danger
is that the added complexity interposes yet another barrier to
effective decision making.
49. See Frank James Tester, Iglu to Iglujuq, in CRITICAL INUIT STUDIES:
AN ANTHOLOGY OF CONTEMPORARY ARCTIC ETHNOGRAPHY 230, 230-42 (Pa-
mela Stern & Lisa Stevenson eds., 2006).
50. Typing in "financial advisor" in Google's search engine,
www.gooogle.com, draws over 29 million entries.
51. Hence the sharply declining error rates from ages twenty to fifty.
Agarwal et al., supra note 38, at 14.
52. See, e.g., ConsumerReports.org Home Page, http://www
.consumerreports.org (last visited Nov. 30, 2007) (providing independent, ex-
pert information and reviews on numerous goods and services, including per-
sonal finance); Federal Trade Commission Home Page, http://www.ftc.gov (last
visited Nov. 30, 2007) (providing FTC publications on numerous consumer
goods and services); myFICO, FICO Credit Scores, http://www.myfico.com (last
visited Nov. 30, 2007) (assisting consumers in understanding and obtaining
credit scores).
2008] 813
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In evaluating the effectiveness of these self-help strategies,
Bar-Gill is right to draw a distinction between standardized
and nonstandardized products. 53 The likelihood of mistake with
standardized products is much lower than with nonstandar-
dized ones.54 Standardized products are easier to understand,
because the party who sets the standard has an incentive to
make the needed information available to potential customers
in order to decrease their cost of doing business. 55 People will
invest more in mastering standardized devices because they
can spread the cost of their investments over multiple transac-
tions. Examples include computers and cell phones. Put other-
wise, it is easier to gain, and to share with others, useful expe-
rience about a standardized product than a nonstandardized
one. Bar-Gill writes: "if a consumer makes toast only once a
month and there is a 1/100 chance that the toaster will explode
when used, it can take the consumer several years before she
learns about the risk of toaster explosion."5 6 Not if she has
neighbors or reads consumer reports, given that, in Bar-Gill's
hypothetical, virtually every toaster made will explode under
standard use within six months of purchase. (It is worth noting
that the probable fire risk for a consumer product, apart from
tampering, is today less than one part in a million.)5 7 No one, of
course, can get similar levels of assurance in choosing marriage
mates or even colleges.
But these problems do not generally afflict modern con-
sumer markets, namely because the use of web-based informa-
tion has increased transparency so greatly58 that it is hard to
53. Bar-Gill, Exchange, Behavioral Economics, supra note 21, at 749,
756-57.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 756.
57. See U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM'N, HAZARD SCREENING
REPORT: HOUSEWARES AND KITCHEN APPLIANCES 1, 11 (2005), available at
http://www.cpsc.gov/library/hazard housewares.pdf. In 2000, there were 367
reports of death from all types of housewares and kitchen appliances, of which
the single most common cause of death was candle-related fires (108 deaths).
Id. at 8. Most burn victims were over the age of seventy-five. Id. Most of the
minor injuries from housewares and appliances that warranted an emergency
room visit were attributable to mechanical defects. Id. Very few of these inju-
ries appear to be due to defective products of any sort, although the study does
not elaborate on this. Id. at 9.
58. For examples of websites that enable consumers to simultaneously
research and shop for various products, see Amazon.com, http://www.amazon
.com (last visited Nov. 30, 2007) (offering shoppers a variety of products, often
accompanied by consumer feedback); Cars.com Home Page, http://www.cars
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recall the tedium of obtaining information for routine business
transactions before the web. For all the constant fretting about
imperfect information, people do many tasks at their own desks
for which they previously hired expensive and experienced pro-
fessionals. The travel agent for routine flights is gone. And for
good reason: who could conceive of a better way to present in-
formation about pending flights than the Southwest Airlines's
website?59 This naive consumer goes there first because I know
that it works better than the sites of its rivals.60 The improve-
ment in transparency in this market (where payment is made
by credit card) is a thousand-fold greater than it was in the old
days of waiting in line to book tickets with real time travel
agents who struggled to collect and transmit the information on
prices and schedules. That systematic improvement is equally
characteristic of modern credit markets. The ability to access
credit card statements online has done more good for consum-
ers than any form of regulation imaginable. The information is
always up-to-date, and the options on payment are complete, so
even if everyone does not know all the consequences of tardy
payment, it is easy to stay ahead of the curve and make a pay-
ment at the last minute, without being dependent on the vaga-
ries of the U.S. Postal Service. Behavioral economists duly fret
about sticky default provisions, 61 but online credit card trans-
actions offer no reason to worry. On some accounts, including
mine, Chase puts the default button for payment on the current
credit card balance, and not on the amount owing on the last
monthly statement.62 That choice suggests that Chase is more
.com (last visited Nov. 30, 2007) (providing a venue for buying, selling, and re-
searching automobiles); and Cnet.com Home Page, http://www.cnet.com (last
visited Nov. 30, 2007) (providing reviews and purchasing opportunities for cut-
ting-edge electronic items).
59. See Southwest Airlines Home Page, http://www.southwest.com (last
visited Nov. 30, 2007) (providing a clear, simple format that allows fliers to
begin the processes of booking, checking-in, and changing airline fights all
from the Southwest homepage).
60. See Carol Sottili, Airline Web Sites, Poised for Takeoff?, WASH. POST,
May 29, 2005, at P01 (reporting on a consumer survey and study of airline
websites which concluded that Southwest "possessed the industry's best online
booking process").
61. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternal-
ism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1201 (2003). "Libertarian
default rules" is the more accurate, but less provocative term.
62. For a demonstration of the Chase online payment process, see Chase
Credit Cards, http://www.chase.com/PFSCreditCardHome.html (last visited
Nov. 30, 2007) (follow "Try Paperless Statements" hyperlink; then follow
' View a demo of Chase Online" hyperlink; follow "Platinum Visa (...6789)"; se-
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concerned about savvy customers taking advantage of the float
than wringing out extra interest payments from the revolvers
(i.e. those who carry their balances over).63 To be sure, it ap-
pears that American Express puts the default down at mini-
mum payment, 64 which suggests that there is a competition in
strategies, and it would be instructive to see just how many
people still maintain minimum balances just because the op-
tions are presented in that fashion. Probably not that many, if
the American Express client base is sufficiently sophisticated.
Not to worry, one click on the radio button restores the other
option. Chase likely knows that it will be more likely to keep its
customers if it makes clear the payment options. What system
of regulation will do as well?
Bar-Gill, however, does not seize on the dynamic move-
ments inside markets, here driven by Internet technology. Ra-
ther, his static approach begins with the difficulties that con-
sumers face in using nonstandardized products.6 5 But the right
first question asks whether the innovations in information
technology have upset the older ratio between standardized
and nonstandardized products, in ways that favor the former.
Speaking generally, standard products win out because they
reduce the costs of transactions on both sides of the market,
whether we speak of loan securitization or standard rental car
agreements. 66 Let the critics of markets denounce commodifica-
tion of markets in sex or kidneys. 67 But in most markets, the
lect "Pay credit card" hyperlink; without selecting a specific payment amount,
follow "Next" hyperlink). The default payment for the Chase Visa is the cur-
rent account balance, while default for the Chase MasterCard is the less than
the account balance, but more than the minimum payment. Id.
63. See, e.g., Tom Brown & Lacey Plache, Paying with Plastic: Maybe Not
So Crazy, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 63, 77-86 (2006) (analyzing empirical data re-
garding consumer payment decisions vis-&-vis credit and debit cards and con-
cluding that the supply and demand characteristics of the industry do not
support the contention that credit cards are harmful to consumers).
64. For a demonstration of the American Express online payment process,
see American Express, https://www.americanexpress.com/home/fallback
.shtml?axphpqs=l (select "Personal Cards"; select "Learn About Managing
Your Account" hyperlink under 'Manage Your Account"; select "Pay Your
Bill"; select "View Demo"; select "Pay Your Bill"; select "How to Pay Your Bill";
the default amount appears in frame three as "minimum due").
65. Bar-Gill, Exchange, Behavioral Economics, supra note 21, at 756-57.
66. This is because standard contracts reduce transaction costs (e.g., bar-
gaining costs) and the possible information asymmetries are gradually miti-
gated by "learning"; that is, repeated play and information-sharing between
consumers.
67. For an example of an attack on commodification, see generally Eliza-
beth S. Anderson, Is Women's Labor a Commodity?, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 71,
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ability to turn odd assemblages of value into standardized
commodities is the key to success, as in securitization mar-
kets. 68 People in any mainstream business call something a
"commodity" because imitation and dissemination have sucked
out all the monopoly rents from the project.69
Given the virtues of standardization, it is useful to have
some sense of what the term means. Predictably, Bar-Gill gives
a narrower definition than do I, with the express intention of
shrinking that category. Bar-Gill thus points to complex prod-
ucts that often provide potential customers with offers that
vary in two or more dimensions. 70 This, he claims, expands the
opportunity for strategic firm behavior. 71 But by the same to-
ken, the use of these multipart tariffs also helps sophisticated
consumers by allowing them to tailor any transaction to their
needs. Put differently, varying offers simply allow customers to
choose among a wider array of baskets of goods; so customers
avoid the additional costs of modifying some single basket to
suit their varying needs.
In any event, there are two reasons why it is a mistake to
treat the presence of any options as incompatible with the use
of standardized agreements. First, that approach is neatly falsi-
fied by countless examples, including the payment options that
are set up on the Chase credit card sites. 72 Whether or not one
thinks that additional disclosure is needed, there is no reason
to impose an external restraint on the number of permissible
options that can be embedded in a standard form contract.
Standardization of terms helps to facilitate management over-
sight and to preserve essential parity between customers. 73
73 (1990) ("If the thing is to be valued appropriately, its production, exchange,
and enjoyment must be removed from market norms and embedded in a dif-
ferent set of social relationships.").
68. Securitization is defined as the process of "[p]ooling loans for various
purposes into standardized securities backed by those loans." ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF FINANCE 243 (Cheng-Few Lee & Alice C. Lee eds., 2006). Note that the ar-
rangements must be standardized in order for the pooling to take place; oth-
erwise valuation is too difficult to work.
69. Definitions of commoditization typically describe the "process of prices
moving substantially lower because of strong competition" and the consequen-
tial decrease in large returns for competitors. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD
FINANCE AND INVESTMENT DICTIONARY 67 (Barbara J. Etzel ed., 2003).
70. Bar-Gill, Exchange, Behavioral Economics, supra note 21, at 751,
769-76.
71. Id.
72. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
73. Cf. Epstein, Behavioral Economics, supra note 30, at 120-21 (noting
that "no real long-term market distortion" exists for standardized products be-
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Second, an additional advantage of using standardized op-
tions is that it makes comparisons across products offered by
the same, or different, firms more transparent.74 One competi-
tor could claim that for any given price it gives a longer war-
ranty than the current supplier. Transferring that information
seems easy when it is directed toward only one term of the ar-
rangement. Of course, costs impact the ability of rivals to follow
suit. If one seller has an inferior product, then either its war-
ranty coverage will have to shrink or its price will have to rise.
There is in effect no real answer to the competitive disadvan-
tage. Just ask Detroit.7 5
On the second of these issues, it is possible to imagine, as
Bar-Gill imagines, that firms will opt out of the competitive
game. He thus writes: "But when a flaw is pervasive in the in-
dustry, each seller must choose between correcting the flaw and
educating consumers, or just going with the flow. It is not at all
clear that the former correction strategy will always prevail." 76
That observation seems highly implausible in any industry that
is not highly concentrated. For this speak-no-evil approach to
work, it has to be followed by all players. Once a single player
deviates from this collective strategy, the information that is
divulged will make it hard for any player to stick with the older
approach.77
To illustrate, assume five players in an industry. If there is
only a 50% chance that any one of these will deviate from the
cooperative mode, then the odds are only 1 in 32 that the collu-
sive equilibrium will stick. Even that low figure is likely to be
significant, so long as the first firm to deviate from that solu-
tion gains some first-mover advantage, which its own market-
ing expertise should help it obtain. Nor is any firm likely to
cause the market will naturally correct any mistake in information).
74. For an illustration, see, for example, Insurance.com, supra note 36. A
consumer wishing to buy insurance can fill out a standardized form about his
car, insurance history, and insurance needs. See id. Based on the responses to
this standardized form, the site returns price comparisons for a variety of po-
tential insurers. See id. (enter zip code and current insurance status; then fol-
low "Get Quotes Now" hyperlink to complete a standardized form).
75. See, e.g., Micheline Maynard & Nick Bunkley, Foreign Automakers
Pass Detroit in Monthly Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2007, at C4 ("Detroit auto
companies' grip on the American automobile market ended in July [2007]
.... .).
76. Bar-Gill, Exchange, Behavioral Economics, supra note 21, at 751.
77. Unless the party that seeks to press its advantage is unable to make
clear what it is offering to consumers. This is an unlikely scenario given the
skills of modern marketers.
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succeed by adopting some evasive strategy when others have
told the straight story. Customers will migrate from the firm
that gives poorer information. Therefore, so long as built-in op-
tions are part of the standard-form game, the dominant strate-
gy is for firms to move ever-more transactions into standar-
dized categories, and not to develop costly, elaborate ways of
coping with breakdowns in nonstandardized products. Most
web-based transactions reflect this shift towards standard
forms.78
Bar-Gill next argues that these forms are really not stan-
dardized at all, because the conditions that surround their use
depend, for example, not only on what the issuing bank sup-
plies, but also on the distinctive patterns of product use:
[W]hen the nature of the product is more broadly defined to include
the potential uses of the product, then the group of standardized
products shrinks. The value of a product does not depend only on the
product's intrinsic features. It depends also on the potential uses of
the product. And if different consumers use the product differently,
then an otherwise standardized product becomes functionally non-
standardized. And this can inhibit learning. If one consumer uses the
product one way and through this use learns some information about
the product, there is less reason to believe that another consumer who
uses the product in a different way will find this information rele-
vant.
79
This caveat about distinctive uses of standardized products
surely proves too much. By this account, no product is ever
standardized, for if people choose to spend their cash in differ-
ent ways, or to drive identical cars in different ways, then they
pose insurmountable problems for regulators. Regulators find it
difficult to draft sensible regulations for the myriad of unknown
end uses for a given product. But in most contexts, these sup-
posed differences just do not matter. In supermarket transac-
tions the price, type, and quality of milk are all that need to be
known. The buyer can decide whether to drink fresh skim milk
or use it for preparing French toast.
The same principle holds in credit card markets. Just use
the APR for all credit transactions, whether people borrow
money for installing a home office or for a trip to Las Vegas. No
workable system of credit card regulation can respond to a high
78. eBay's site, for example, requires users to register by completing a
standardized form that includes personal information. Once registered, a user
can access a series of standardized forms to search for, bid on, and purchase
products. See eBay.com Home Page, http://www.ebay.com (last visited Nov. 30,
2007).
79. Bar-Gill, Exchange, Behavioral Economics, supra note 21, at 757.
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rate of foolish purchases, if such they be. For those issues, the
only plausible form of regulation must hone in on permissible
end uses by allowing, perhaps unwisely, people to return cer-
tain specified goods sold by door-to-door salesmen, within three
days of purchase.8 0 Bar-Gill cannot wiggle out of the following
dilemma. The transactions that qualify as nonstandardized un-
der his definition are precisely those for which any system of
direct credit card regulation will fail, even if his reforms are
adopted. The more appropriate cure for imprudent purchasing
is not paternalistic credit card regulations, but rather lifestyle
consultants and personal finance managers. For some people, a
succession of unwise purchases may be a sign that they need
personalized help, which no lender could sensibly provide.
The regulation of nonstandardized markets also invites
further difficulties. Just how is this done? Repeatedly, Bar-Gill
stresses that the empirical nature of the underlying problems
calls for a case-by-case or market-by-market response. 8 ' Factor
in the cost of public regulation, and the likelihood of a success-
ful outcome seems slim. The "proper" market does not magical-
ly present itself, even if we ignore the endless variations in user
markets. One example of the difficulty arises with the Austral-
ian Reserve Bank's decision to control interchange fees in four-
party credit transactions of the sort used by Visa and Master-
Card, but not the three-party transactions used by American
Express.
8 2
80. The relevant social judgments are hard to make because there are no
good estimates of the rate of return in these transactions or the reasons for the
returns that do take place. One recent estimate places the rate of return for all
consumer goods at around 6%, but that includes much higher rates for Inter-
net and catalog sales where there is no opportunity for inspection at the time
of purchase. See Steven A. Matthews & Nicola Persico, Information Acquisi-
tion and Refunds for Returns 1 (Penn Inst. for Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 07-021, 2007), available at http://pier.econ.upenn.eduArchive/07-021.pdf.
Presumably the rate of return for items sold at the door would be lower. In
some cases, one should expect for the return privilege to be voluntarily ex-
tended at which point it should be noncontroversial. It is much harder to make
any judgment about those returns that are made solely pursuant to a statuto-
ry guarantee, where the dangers of consumer opportunism may raise the price
for other consumers who do not avail themselves of the return privilege. Note
that the argument for a cooling-off period in a loan is far weaker for money
presents no risk of unknown or defective characteristics.
81. See Bar-Gill, Exchange, Behavioral Economics, supra note 21, at 751,
768.
82. In four-party transactions, a merchant presents a credit card payment
to its bank, which then is paid by the customer's bank, which in turn charges
the customers. Visa and MasterCard charge an "interchange fee" that lops off
part of the repayment to the merchant bank. American Express is an inte-
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The Australian Reserve Bank thought that both consumer
misperceptions about credit cards and the strong chokehold po-
sition of Visa and MasterCard justified cutting interchange
fees, erroneously in my view.8 3 But even if the bank read the
situation correctly, it limited its intervention to the four-party
arrangements of Visa and MasterCard to the exclusion of the
three-party system of American Express. 84 Unfortunately, then,
Bar-Gill's case-by-case approach opens the door to selective
regulation that distorts the competitive processes, which could
easily offset any supposed gains of direct regulation. 85 Sure
enough, in the Australian market, the differential system of
regulation did create a competitive advantage for American
Express.8 6 In sum, there seems to be little reason to think that
the costs of additional regulation will be cost effective, and
much reason to fear that selective regulation of credit card
markets will introduce other distortions of far greater magni-
tude.
II. EMPIRICAL STUDIES: A QUESTION OF PERSPECTIVE
The situation does not become more palatable when we
look at the particular cases of consumer misperception on
which Bar-Gill relies. At the outset, his accounts do little with
the notion that distinctive downstream uses create nonstan-
dardized products. Rather, the cases that he presents all deal
with misestimates of the future use or value of the product
sold.87 As an initial matter, it is important to note that these
risks rank far below other credit card hazards, such as fraud,
which has become a more important risk as of late. 88 Historical-
grated outfit that deals with both merchants and cardholders. It charges no
interchange fee between banks, but keeps a fraction of the amount owed for
payment, which often exceeds that charged in the four-party systems. For ac-
counts of these systems, see DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE,
PAYING WITH PLASTIC: THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION IN BUYING AND BORROWING
1-21 (2d ed. 2005) and Epstein, Interchange, supra note 30, at 553-54.
83. See Epstein, Interchange, supra note 30, at 556.
84. Id. at 560-61.
85. See id. at 556.
86. See id. at 560-61.
87. See, e.g., Bar-Gill, Exchange, Behavioral Economics, supra note 21,
763 (citing various studies to suggest that "consumers are optimistic about
their future credit needs; about their future will power; about the likelihood
that they will switch to a new card with a new, low introductory rate; or all of
the above").
88. See, e.g., United States Secret Service, Criminal Investigations, http:/!
www.secretservice.gov/criminal.shtml (last visited Nov. 30, 2007) ("Financial
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ly, fraud includes the activities of persons who incurred credit
card debt that they did not intend to repay, and the practices of
people who use stolen credit cards for personal gain.8 9 Today,
the biggest risk by far is the systematic theft of credit card in-
formation by people, often operating outside the United States,
who hack into credit card databases that are maintained by re-
tailers and data processors. 90 Fraud of this sort can result in
losses in the billions of dollars each year, for which individual
prudence is no real protection.91 Second on the list is the pano-
ply of monopolization charges brought against various compa-
nies, where billions more are at risk.92 The cost implications of
these risks-fraud and monopoly rents-easily dwarf the small
and speculative wealth transfers that might occur right now
from consumers' cognitive biases. Put differently, if we adopted
Bar-Gill's regulatory approach, we should fall prey to our own
biases by spending large sums of money to prevent small spe-
culative losses, when these dollars are better spent in control-
ling losses from schemes and machinations that cause a thou-
sand-fold greater loss.
In comparison to these issues, the supposed ability of credit
card companies and other firms to manipulate various terms of
their agreements looks like small potatoes. Its behavioral com-
ponent is only a small part of the overall story. Other more tra-
ditional efficiency-based explanations play a far larger role.
In this Part, I shall deploy the neoclassical economic pers-
pective to critique Bar-Gill's behavioral explanations in six con-
tentious areas: (1) teaser rates, or low introductory interest
rates offered by lenders; (2) hyperbolic discounting, or the prac-
tice of buying more than one should when prices are low; (3)
universal default, whereby lenders will raise interest rates on
one loan because of a default on an unrelated loan; (4) the so-
called credit card debt puzzle, whereby some customers keep
industry sources estimate annual losses associated with credit card fraud to be
in the billions of dollars.").
89. For further discussion of these issues, see Richard A. Epstein & Tho-
mas P. Brown, Cybersecurity in the Payment Card Industry, 75 U. CHI. L. REV.
(forthcoming Mar. 2008).
90. For an illustration of this process, see id. at 12 (recounting the theft of
data from TJX Co. in 2006).
91. United States Secret Service, supra note 88.
92. See, e.g., In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litigation, 280 F.3d
124, 129-30 (2d Cir. 2001); see also EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 82, at
267-96 (discussing antitrust disputes among card companies, merchants and
the federal government).
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money in the bank that might be better used to pay off the
card; (5) various non-credit-card-related issues; and (6) health
club memberships. I will show how in each of these contexts, it
is far likelier that most consumers are acting strategically ra-
ther than irrationally.
A. TEASER RATES
Bar-Gill's first example of how "consumers make systemat-
ic mistakes" involves teaser, or low-interest introductory
rates. 93 The supposed mistake comes from consumers who do
not switch to other teaser rates offered by other banks, once
their initial low-rate period runs out, especially since the con-
sumers maintain about the same credit card balances as be-
fore.94 The implicit premise of his argument, which rests on the
empirical research of Haiyan Shui and Lawrence Ausubel, is
that the transactions costs to switch are less than the expected
gains from shifting, at least for these nonrevolvers. 95 (Revolv-
ers, who pay off their loans regularly, do not care about these
rates.)
But that conclusion hardly seems obvious. Switching a cre-
dit card company involves more than filing a new application.
There may be lag in getting the response, and furthermore,
canceling an existing card can be risky if there are disputed or
outstanding charges, or if the credit card is used to pay off cer-
tain monthly bills on a regular basis.96 Any shift in card com-
panies goes on the general credit record, which could lead other
companies to turn down an applicant who is known regularly to
switch. 97 In addition, the game is a bit trickier for the people
who keep multiple credit cards, as it is not easy to juggle six or
so cards at one time. Also, many people may think that this
form of opportunism is not fair play, however legal. It is a bit
like going to a reception to grab some food without staying to
93. Bar-Gill, Exchange, Behavioral Economics, supra note 21, at 776,
779-80.
94. Id. at 779-80.
95. See Haiyan Shui & Lawrence M. Ausubel, Time Inconsistency in the
Credit Card Market, 25-26 (May 3, 2004), (unpublished manuscript, available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=586622).
96. But see EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 82, at 232 ("It is easy to
switch cards, and people do so all the time.").
97. See myFICO, Improving Your FICO Credit Score, http://www.myfico
.com/CreditEducation/ImproveYourScore.aspx (last visited Nov. 30, 2007)
(warning against opening new accounts "too rapidly" because new accounts
"can look risky" for a new user).
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listen to the dinner speaker like others in attendance. And if it
were done too often, then these rates would just dry up. Having
read Bar-Gill's plea, I have no intention of changing my credit
cards any time soon, with all the fuss and bother it entails.
B. HYPERBOLIC DISCOUNTING
Bar-Gill relies on still another study that suggests that
people are prone to "hyperbolic discounting," such that a com-
modity is more valuable today than the identical commodity in
the near future. 98 It is no surprise that some individuals prefer
a steeper discount for a shorter period to a higher one for a
somewhat longer period. Thus if people know that they can ac-
celerate their purchases-perhaps by timing the acquisition of
a new card with large expenditures-then the purchase pattern
makes sense. And if not, it remains unclear in dollar terms just
how large the savings are.
In sum, an understanding of transaction costs and normal
social practices explains why people hold on to their credit
cards without invoking any hyperbolic discounting hypothesis,
which assumes that people overweigh their losses in the imme-
diate period as against potential gains down the road. "A con-
sumer is said to be a hyperbolic discounter if her short-run dis-
count rate is larger than her long-run discount rate."99 Bar-Gill
acknowledges that there is little evidence of hyperbolic dis-
counting in long-term mortgage markets, where the typical
balances are far higher than those on credit cards.10 0 He then
observes that "the fact that consumers make few mistakes in
one market does not imply that they make few mistakes in all
markets."10 1 That proposition is surely right if an inference was
drawn about markets in hosiery from markets in credits. But it
packs lots less pop when the move is from credit cards to mort-
gages, especially since no credit card has the outsized interest
rates that are reported in some experimental settings: up to
98. Bar-Gill, Exchange, Behavioral Economics, supra note 21, at 765 (cit-
ing Stephan Meier & Charles Sprenger, Impatience and Credit Behavior: Evi-
dence from a Field Experiment 5 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, Working Paper
No. 07-03, 2007), available at http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/wp/wp2007/
wp0703.pdf).
99. See, e.g., Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, supra note 28, at 1395-1401
(stating that imperfect self-control, optimism bias, and hyperbolic discounting
cause excessive borrowing).
100. Bar-Gill, Exchange, Behavioral Economics, supra note 21, at 768.
101. Id.
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345% for the first month, 120% for the year, and 19% for a ten-
year wait, reported in the experimental literature.10 2
Bar-Gill never proposes specific regulation for this ailment,
but he does try to make the case for some regulation by using
his own estimates as a basis for computing social loss. Thus he
writes that "the $250 cost of failing to switch cards at the end of
the introductory period is born by the 35% of borrowing con-
sumers who chose cards with introductory offers-1.4 million
consumers each year. This implies an aggregate annual cost of
$350 million."10 3 But the overstatement should be manifest in
this conclusion. If the above criticisms of Bar-Gill's account of
teaser rates are correct, then some of these consumers, perhaps
even most, have played it right, at which point the lost pay-
ments could easily plummet. In any event, the $350 million on-
ly refers to an inflated estimate of transfer payments. It does
not explain why the social losses that stem from these pay-
ments should be regarded as equal to the size of the transfer
payments. And what should be done anyhow, given that it does
not make sense to order people to take out new cards when the
low rates end?
C. UNIVERSAL DEFAULT
Yet another practice that Bar-Gill finds. objectionable re-
lates to the question of universal default, which was the topic of
a recent Senate hearing.104 Universal default refers to the prac-
tice whereby interest rates on credit card loans will be raised in
the event of a default of some other, and unrelated, noncredit
card bill.105 The practice is not used uniformly throughout the
industry,1 06 which indicates that market pressures are at work.
102. Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Crit-
ical Review, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 162, 172-75 (Colin F.
Camerer et al. eds., 2004). For my critique, see Epstein, Behavioral Econom-
ics, supra note 30, at 129-31.
103. Bar-Gill, Exchange, Behavioral Economics, supra note 21, at 787.
104. See Hearing on Credit Card Practices: Fees, Interest, and Grace Pe-
riods Before the Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland
Sec. and Gov't Affairs, 109th Cong. 1-5 (2007) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin,
Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Investigations); see also Marcy Gordon, Panel Re-
viewing Credit Card Practices, CINCINNATI POST, Mar. 7, 2007, at A9.
105. See 2005 Credit Card Survey, CONSUMER ACTION NEWS (Consumer
Action, San Francisco, Cal.), Summer 2005, at 1, available at http://www
.consumer-action.org/downloads/englishCCIssue 2005.pdf.
106. See id. (noting that banks with universal default policies exhibit a
widespread variation in determining how consumers may reduce their high
interest rates following a default); see also Gordon, supra note 104 (reporting
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These are likely to have a strong impact if the increase comes
without some form of advance notice to the individual card-
holder that explains why the unrelated delinquency has altered
interest rates. But some firms have persisted with the prac-
tice, 10 7 and with suitable disclosures early in the process, that
decision does not appear to signal any form of cognitive bias or
market failure. To the contrary, there is good reason to believe
that defaults on unrelated loans are themselves positively cor-
related, such that a party who has defaulted on one occasion is
more likely to do so on others. If so, then the universal default
provision, even if modified to allow for delayed implementation,
can be defended as a way of reducing the cross-subsidies from
better to worse credit risks, a move that has obvious efficiency
advantages. As so often is the case, the aggressive condemna-
tion of controversial practices may make credit markets less
and not more efficient. There is little reason to think that indi-
vidual credit card holders will volunteer information about
their present credit status. The use of comprehensive credit de-
vices could be defended on the ground that it reduces that most
ubiquitous of market failures-asymmetrical information.
D. CHECKING ACCOUNTS VERSUS CREDIT CARDS
I think that there is more merit to a study by David Gross
and Nicholas Souleles, which notes that people keep money in
their checking accounts at low rates of interest even as they do
not pay off their credit card debt on which they have to pay a
far higher rate of interest.108 But at least one competing expla-
nation demands attention. There are costs to running down
checking account balances. The low average or minimum could
trigger higher bank fees on accounts with minimum deposits.10 9
Using checking account funds to pay off the credit card could
also make it awkward to write checks. Keeping the credit card
that the nation's largest financial company, Citigroup, recently announced
plans to eliminate the practice of universal default).
107. See 2005 Credit Card Survey, supra note 105, at 1 (noting that 44.68%
of banks still maintain universal default polices).
108. David B. Gross & Nicholas S. Souleles, Do Liquidity Constraints and
Interest Rates Matter for Consumer Behavior? Evidence from Credit Card Da-
ta, 117 Q.J. ECON. 149, 180 (2002).
109. See, e.g., Chase Personal Banking, Checking Overview, http://www
.chase.comlccp/index.jsp?pg name=ccpmapp/individualscheckingpage
checking-overview (last visited Nov. 30, 2007) (indicating that in some Chase
Checking products, such as "Chase Better Banking Checking," a monthly ser-
vice fee may be charged if the account balance falls below a predetermined
amount).
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balance alive could preserve both options, so long as the card
has not been maxed out. People are willing to pay for valuable
options. But the price becomes too steep for large loans, at
which point loan consolidations start to make sense. A close
empirical study of who takes them out and when could help
shed more light on the underlying problem.
Economists who have reviewed Gross and Souleles's paper
have advanced three competing explanations. 110 One explana-
tion suggests that lower-income households-or households
with income uncertainty-are likely to run up their credit card
debt, because they know that their debts accrued in this form
are dischargeable upon bankruptcy.1 1' At the same time, their
liquid assets can quickly be converted into exempt property
during the bankruptcy filing.11 2 Accordingly, the empirical
work finds that higher credit card debt is more common in
states where bankruptcy exemptions are easily obtained, just
as the rational choice theory would predict. 1 3 A second expla-
nation is that the information revealed in connection with cre-
dit card purchases allows for intrafamily control on unwanted
spending.1 1 4 Assume that the wife were the only earner within
the family. If her husband used her credit card to purchase
high-end gizmos, she could decline to pay the card debt to check
his behavior.1 15 Finally, many people may prefer to keep cash
in the bank if their regular expenditures-rent, cab rides, and
sundries-cannot be paid through credit cards.1 1 6 Many small
towns and suburbs, including Hyde Park, are filled with shops
and service providers that refuse to accept credit cards. Unlike
Bar-Gill's explanation, all three of these explanations suggest
110. See Irina A. Telyukova, Household Need for Liquidity and the Credit
Card Debt Puzzle 2-3 (Nov. 16, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://dss.ucsd.edu/-itelyuko/telyukova-ccdp.pdf).
111. See Andreas Lehnert & Dean M. Maki, Consumption, Debt, and Port-
folio Choice: Testing the Effect of Bankruptcy Law 1-2 (Fed. Reserve Board
Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2004-12, 2002), available
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/Pubs/feds/2002/200214/200214pap.pdf.
112. See id. at 31-32.
113. See id. at 3.
114. See Telyukova, supra note 110, at 2.
115. Carol C. Bertraut & Michael Haliassos, Debt Revolvers for Self Control
3-4, 24 (Univ. of Cyprus Dep't of Econ., Discussion Paper No. 2002-08, 2002),
available at http://www.econ.ucy.ac.cy/papers/0208.pdf; see Telyukova, supra
note 110, at 2.
116. See Telyukova, supra note 110, at 37 (suggesting that the "liquidity
need hypothesis" may account for 79% of the households that take on addi-
tional credit card debt while having sufficient savings to pay this debt off).
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that cardholders are acting strategically rather than irrational-
ly.
E. NON-CREDIT CARD CASES
In addition to looking at studies from the credit card indus-
try, Bar-Gill goes further astray to document the notion of
"misperception-based pricing" that can arise whenever consum-
ers are faced with a pricing regime with two or more dimen-
sions. 117 Sellers, even in competitive markets, can manipulate
terms to receive an undeserved rate of return. His example is a
kitchen table that could sell for either $100 or for $110 with a
$20 rebate.118 If consumers choose the rebate plan, they could
end up paying more as a group by not cashing in 50% of the
time. 119
Bar-Gill has done his sums right, but not his economics. It
is always risky strategy to play the rebate game, given the risk
of adverse selection. The likely scenario is that buyers will self-
select into two categories: those who are inattentive take the
fixed price; those who are more disciplined take the rebate.
Misperceptions have to be quite strong to counter that risk. We
should look, therefore, elsewhere for asking why rebates are of-
fered. In some markets, secret rebates are used where marginal
cost pricing is highly inefficient, as with pharmaceuticals. 120
The impulse is to use the rebate as a sensible form of price dis-
crimination. But most markets are not as complex as pharma-
ceuticals. Recently the website for Brother International Cor-
poration displayed a $20 rebate on the cheapest home
consumer printer, but on no others. 12 1 No theory of misconcep-
tion-based pricing can explain this selective rebate. A simpler
explanation is that the rebate is one way to stimulate sales of
slow-moving or discontinued models. 122 The skeptic should ask
117. Bar-Gill, Exchange, Behavioral Economics, supra note 21, at 769-72.
118. Id. at 769-70.
119. Id. at 770.
120. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE: How EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT
REGULATION STIFLES PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 68-70 (2006) (discussing
why "secret deals" are an "indispensable feature" of the pharmaceutical mar-
ket).
121. See Brother, HL-2040 Laser Printer, http://www.brother-usa.com
Printer/ModelDetail.aspx?ProductID=HL2040 (last visited Nov. 30, 2007).
122. See Matthew A. Edwards, The Law, Marketing and Behavioral Eco-
nomics of Consumer Rebates, 12 STAN. J.L. BuS. & FIN. 362, 376 (2007) ("Firms
use rebates to stimulate sales, obtain marketing information and engage in
price discrimination.").
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why the rebate is preferable to a conspicuous price cut, for
which I doubt marketing people would point to misperception
pricing.
This discussion easily segues to one of Bar-Gill's favorite
examples, the combined purchase printer and ink. 123 The two-
part pricing schedule allows a vendor to undersell the printer
in order to recoup revenues on the sales of the cartridges to
customers who underestimate their use.124 But Bar-Gill offers
no evidence that people systematically underestimate or over-
estimate their use, when the most plausible assumption, espe-
cially in commercial markets with large accounts, is that the
professionals get it right. Indeed, if small toner cartridges print
10,000 sheets for $80, the cost of paper exceeds the cost of the
toner: at $6 per ream of 500 sheets, it equals, $120, for which
there is no tie.125 So why worry about the ink? Nor is there any
reason to worry if the price of paper is just ignored. The Hew-
lett-Packard website goes to enormous lengths to persuade con-
sumers not to refill their empty cartridges with ink supplied
from other suppliers. 26 That constant source of competition
must exert at least some pressure on prices. The exclusive
rights that the printing companies have over their own car-
tridges, which have been sustained against antitrust chal-
lenges, 27 do not block this distinct form of entry.
Other forces also limit the pricing freedom to printer man-
ufacturers. Low printer prices bring the customer in while the
toner price facilitates demand-based price discrimination,
where the cost varies with the intensity of use. But monitoring
does not imply extra high prices in light of the refill option, and
the ability of customers to move elsewhere given the low prin-
ter prices. The enormous range of printer and toner choices
hardly speaks to price manipulation but rather to vigorous
competition in markets with sophisticated customers, 28 many
123. Bar-Gill, Exchange, Behavioral Economics, supra note 21, at 773-74.
124. Id.
125. See Office Depot, Paper Depot-Office Supplies, http://www.officedepot
.combrowse.do?Nr=2 ---- &N=200878 (last visited Nov. 30, 2007) (showing the
range of prices for reams of paper).
126. HP, The Truth About Remanufactured Ink and Toner Cartridges,
http:/lh71036.www7.hp.comlhho/cache/459406-0-O-225-12 1.html?jumpid=ex_
r602_info/inkandpaper/printcartridges/refill-inkandtoner (last visited Nov. 30,
2007).
127. Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 44-45 (2006) (re-
quiring proof of a monopoly in the tying product market to attack the tie-in).
128. See, e.g., id. at 31-33, 46 (stating that selling a printing system with a
patented printerhead, patented ink container, and unpatented ink does not
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of whom are professional buyers for firms. In this market, ordi-
nary consumers can free ride the sophisticated buyers' exper-
tise. One look at the Office Depot website 129 should confirm
that view. The dominant price movement is down, down, down
while performance moves up, up, up. Regulation to insure cost-
justified pricing for toner cartridges is a wild goose chase.
F. HEALTH CLUBS
The health club market reveals the same pattern. The
problems of estimation are not dominant for folks with regular
routines. Practically, one membership problem arises for people
who live in one city for only part of the year, and so desire
plans that suspend their monthly membership fees during pe-
riods of absence, for which the East Bank Club of Chicago
makes allowances, at least for people over sixty-five. 130 But the
real difficulty in these cases is strategic behavior by customers.
Hence this warning: "There are never discounts or specials on
membership, so it doesn't really matter when you join. You can
cancel your membership at any time, but think hard first, be-
cause you won't be allowed to join again for nine months."131
"The price? Not cheap but not as steep as I had anticipated:
There is a $500 enrollment fee and monthly fees range from
$115 to $165."132 The monthly pricing helps the clubs stabilize
their earnings and to prepare for the anticipated use of their
facilities. The multiple plans are needed to cope with customer
heterogeneity. Quite sensibly East Bank Club commits itself to
relative prices. The customer then decides which option gene-
rates the highest surplus. Pricing misperception does not look
like a credible story.
There is, of course, no way to present results that indicate
that all people are free of bias and error in their daily lives. But
that is not the real issue that divides Bar-Gill and myself. I be-
lieve that mistakes are a part of life, but that people who suffer
from them seek to avoid them. In examining their behavior, it
create a presumption of the suppression of competition).
129. Office Depot, Ink Depot, http://www.officedepot.com/inkTonerManuf
.do;jsessionid=0000SKQ5VOpG3gV7v99CMksfs:llst68oo3 (last visited Nov.
30, 2007) (providing pricing and discount information on a wide variety of ink
cartridges).
130. Telephone Interview by Damon Brinson with Andrew Koennecke, Se-
nior Representative, East Bank Club, in Chi., Ill. (Oct. 5, 2007).
131. Centerstage Chicago, East Bank Club, http://centerstagechicago.com/
healthclubs/500NKingsbury.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2007).
132. My Kind of Club, http://fitsugar.com/118989 (Feb. 5, 2007, 02:00 EST).
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is unsound methodologically to stress the errors in human be-
havior before gaining a full explanation of why some behaviors
may be more rational than they appear. The six areas just re-
viewed give some hint of the general approach, for in each we
can find some rational explanation which at the very least indi-
cates that the behavioral anomalies to which Bar-Gill points
should be regarded as second-order problems.
III. THE FUTILITY OF (MUCH) MORE GLOBAL
REGULATION
The last Part of Bar-Gill's Article contains his grand plea
for further regulation, with due emphasis on both terms. As to
the former, we both accept the use of the APR 133 and the
"Schumer Box"134 to convey relevant information. My guess is
that firms are comfortable with both because they boost the
overall willingness of consumers to acquire credit cards by lo-
wering the costs of acquisition. But is there more low-hanging
fruit that is worth harvesting? I doubt it. Bar-Gill has no specif-
ic proposal. Instead he tries to make out the case for further
legislation by pointing to regular standbys: negative externali-
ties 135 and adverse distributional consequences. 136 The former
follow because credit card debt can take down families. 137 But
on the other side of the ledger, the inability to gain credit has
negative externalities as well, especially if parties are forced in-
to the arms of shadier lenders who have higher costs and more
uncertain collection and control procedures. So even if the
stakes are higher, the choice between the status quo and fur-
ther (or even less) regulation is unclear. On the distributional
frontier, he notes that the consequences of error are more likely
to fall on poorer persons with limited education.1 38 He might
have also mentioned, first, that the ability of poorer families to
get credit cards will, on average help their position. 39 Second,
the current forms of disclosure offer their greatest advantage to
the least educated-since educated customers self-protect bet-
133. See Bar-Gill, Exchange, Behavioral Economics, supra note 21, 795-97.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 788-89.
136. Id. at 789-90.
137. See id. at 788.
138. See id. at 789.
139. Cf. Epstein, Behavioral Economics, supra note 30, at 128 ("Nor are
bankrupt parties necessarily victims of some underlying cognitive bias. Credit
cards allow purchase of expensive equipment needed to start a new risky
business venture.").
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ter-even if the costs of regulatory compliance are spread
across a wider population. Broad considerations such as these
hardly tell us what to do next.
Bar-Gill also espouses the view that self-regulation within
the industry helps guard against extending credit to those who
are not in a position to use it wisely. 14 0 My position is that the
prospect of serious losses explains why credit card companies
turn down some applicants and impose financial limitations on
others. Bar-Gill counters that credit card companies might jet-
tison self-regulation to adopt a "sweat box" model whereby the
high fees along the way more than compensate for the inability
to recover anything in bankruptcy. 14 1 That approach requires
credit card companies to live dangerously, especially if the risks
of default among customers are positively correlated.
In truth, the real difficulties are not in consumer credit
markets, but in the subprime mortgage markets, which has re-
ceived extensive coverage as of late. 142 But it is very difficult to
attribute this problem to consumer misperceptions when the
big losers in these transactions tend to be the mortgage institu-
tions and hedge funds that were prepared to make high-risk
loans at what turned out to be favorable rates.143 As of March
2007, around 14% of monthly payments were sixty days late,
up by about 100% in the past year. 144 One major lender, New
Century Financial, has had to restate earnings for three quar-
ters and is under criminal investigation. 145 A second, Fremont
General, announced its intention to sell off its subprime portfo-
lio.146 Federal regulators under their present powers are think-
ing about imposing tighter standards, 147 and on August 17,
140. Bar-Gill, Exchange, Behavioral Economics, supra note 21, at 784-86.
141. Id. at 785-86.
142. See, e.g., Nelson D. Schwartz & Vikas Bajaj, Credit Time Bomb
Ticked, but Few Heard, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2007, at Al.
143. See id.
144. James R. Hagerty et al., Subprime Troubles Grow, WALL ST. J., Mar.
3, 2007, at A3.
145. Vikas Bajaj & Julie Creswell, Authorities Investigate Big Lender, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 2007, at Cl.
146. See Greg Morcroft, New Century, Fremont Sink on Subprime Woes,
MARKETWATCH, Mar. 5, 2007, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/new-
century-fremont-general-suffer/story.aspx?guid=%7B7E98AAA5-94B9-4DCC-
BBA4-704F72A977FE%7D.
147. See Alistair Barr, 'Panic' Takes Hold as Subprime Lenders Slump,
MARKETWATCH, Mar. 5, 2007, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/
subprime-panic-takes-hold-investors/story.aspx?guid=%7B75E 1EE3 1%
2DOF63%2D422D%2D8715%2D2CB945DFF410%7D.
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2007 lowered the discount rate on loans it charged to member
banks in order to calm a jittery market.148 But it is hard to see
what the behavioral finance literature contributes to this dis-
cussion. Certainly its concerns have not been featured in the
extensive commentary on the matter, and for good reason. As
for the high-risk lenders, the simplest explanation remains the
best. They took large risks on their loan portfolio and now have
to pay the price when the market turned bad. The reversal does
not suggest any irrationality. No one gets something for noth-
ing, and the high failure rate is consistent with the high rates
of return earlier on. None of their activity is driven by the abili-
ty of these mortgage companies to exploit pricing mispercep-
tions, which could be handled under the current laws. Rather,
the recent flurry stems from the bets that subprime lenders
made on the housing market,149 which turned bad when that
market turned weak. These lenders did not make up through
high interest rates what they lost on principal. 150
The irony on this point lies in the position of the borrowers,
many of whom stand to lose their homes. In dealing with these
cases, their position is probably better than that of the lenders.
They may have had little or no equity in their homes. 51 Some
of them may well be able to repurchase their own liens for a
fraction of the value, thereby reducing after the fact the cost of
acquiring their own properties. 152 Others may have actions
against various subprime lenders for misrepresentation, con-
cealment, or fraud. 5 3 If anything we have a situation where
lenders turn out to be more vulnerable than borrowers.
148. See Schwartz & Bajaj, supra note 142.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See Alan Reynolds, Subprime Economics, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2007,
http://www3.washingtontimes.com/commentary/20070324-100652-2256r.htm
("Subprime borrowers who made no down payment already have a terrible
credit rating, so they have nothing to lose if they can't sell their homes at a
profit.").
152. See John M. Berry, There May Be an Out for Some Subprime Borrow-
ers, BLOOMBERG.COM, Oct. 11, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?
pid=20601170&refer=special-report&sid=anxOH4nvldeE (analyzing ways
subprime borrowers might be able to refinance their mortgages at better rates
in order to keep their homes).
153. For an overview of some of the existing remedies, see U.S. DEP'T OF
Hous. & URBAN DEV. & U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY TASK FORCE ON PREDATORY
LENDING, CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 53-56 (2000),
available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/treasrpt.pdf (discussing
some of the various remedies already available against predatory lenders).
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Judged by the standards of the subprime market, the cre-
dit card market stands as a tower of strength. At one level, they
are less exposed because they make smaller loans for shorter
periods.154 But these credit lenders face some long-term
risks. 1 5 Fortunately, it looks most unlikely that any of them
are following policies that are inconsistent with their own card
limits and credit scoring devices. The risks of default are hard
to offset by sustainable increases in interest rates. Suppose
that a company collects 30% interest for two years on average
balances of $2000, with another 10% in fees. It is now up $800.
It is hard to see how that sum compensates for a bankruptcy
that results in a loss of that outstanding balance after two
years. Even a five-year run looks very dicey. It is far more
plausible for a bank to adopt the tried-and-true two-part strat-
egy. First, try to accurately classify and limit the risk, and then
charge the right rates for the risks that remain. Self-regulation
still matters, and where it does not, the problem is not with
credit card companies that exploit the innocent. It is with those
who let themselves get exploited by foolish credit card deci-
sions. Yet there is no way to help through regulation once the
usual disclosures have been made. Rather, individualized at-
tention to look at the entire earning and spending pattern is far
better, and far more targeted. There is no reason to bring down
people who know how to use credit cards in the futile effort to
help those who would be in as much trouble with pay-day loans
as with credit cards.
In the end, the most that one could contemplate are modest
emendations of what goes into the Schumer Box. One candidate
could concern unexpected increases (fully disclosed at the time)
in annual fees after the initial honeymoon period. Bar-Gill
thinks that Rossman v. Fleet Bank (R.I.) National Associa-
tion56 leaves too much play in the joints. 5 7 But the whole point
is little more than a tempest in a teapot. The major fear is that
the bank could impose an annual fee of not $35 but $350, but
154. See Todd. J. Zywicki, The Economics of Credit Cards, 3 CHAP. L. REV.
79, 120 (2000) (pointing out that credit card loans differ from other types of
loans since they "require the lender to process a large volume of relatively
small transactions").
155. See Epstein, Behavioral Economics, supra note 30, at 128; Zywicki,
supra note 154, at 123-27.
156. 280 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2002). For a discussion of this case in the context
of behavioral economics, see Epstein, Behavioral Economics, supra note 30, at
125-27.
157. Bar-Gill, Exchange, Behavioral Economics, supra note 21, at 796-97.
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there is no evidence that this maneuver has ever been at-
tempted, or that any bank could survive the din once that in-
formation became common knowledge. Perhaps, just perhaps,
we might require shifts in fees not to exceed $100 per annum,
to pick a number. The point here is to prohibit that which will
not happen anyhow. So why bother? Tinker if we must. Yet
that said, I think that it is plain why the disclosure issues for
credit card regulation have no political traction today, even
with the advent of the behavioral approach. No one is quite
sure what additional disclosures should be made, or has any
confidence that they could alter these behaviors if they are as
ingrained as Bar-Gill and others presuppose. Or that if people
do substitute away from credit cards, they will take a straight
and narrow path instead of some other ruinous choice.
The overall picture seems clear. Proposed systems of regu-
lation may have some games. But these are likely to provide at
most ephemeral gains at best to the bottom end of the distribu-
tion, but only at a high price for everyone else. Truth be known,
most people like credit cards for their unparalleled conveni-
ence. 158 Most people would rather have higher limits than low-
er ones. The ability of the vast majority of the population or
more to use these cards well cannot be ignored. 159 The ex ante
costs of regulation fall on good and bad consumers alike, which
means that it won't pass if most people are comfortable with
the system they have. In the end, we shall see at most marginal
changes on this frontier unless and until some widespread
scam hits the marketplace. The real issues have to do with in-
dustry structure and the security of credit card information.
Behavioral economics comes in a distant third place, and there
for the foreseeable future, it will happily remain.
158. See Epstein, Behavioral Economics, supra note 30, at 124 (discussing
reasons why credit cards are widely perceived as desirable).
159. See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 82, at 102-03.
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